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Foreign Policy and the Euro:  
We Have an Idea 
Sven Biscop 
With the Euro in crisis, EU foreign policy 
evidently  suffers  for  lack  of  money  and 
attention. But the way the Eurozone crisis 
is being discussed is also fundamentally at 
odds  with  the  idea  underpinning  the 
Union’s  foreign  policy  –  and  indeed  the 
Union as such. 
That  the  financial  and  economic  crisis  in 
Europe  and  the  crisis  of  the  Eurozone  in 
particular do not bode well for the European 
Union’s foreign policy is self-evident.  
 
In times of austerity, first, there simply is less 
money  available  for  external  action.  Foreign 
policy in the narrow sense, or diplomacy, may 
not  seem  such  a  costly  policy  area.  But  EU 
foreign  policy  adopts  a  broad,  holistic 
approach, putting to use all of the instruments 
for  external  action,  from  aid  and  trade  to 
diplomacy and the military, where possible in 
partnership with other States and regional and 
multilateral  organizations.  Consolidating 
democratization  in  the  countries  living  an 
“Arab  Spring”  will  require  massive  economic 
investment, in order both to create some short-
time benefits that strengthen the hopes of the 
people  and  to  generate  long-term  economic 
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development.  This  is  but  the  most  evident 
example  of  an  urgent  challenge  in  our  own 
neighbourhood  on  which  the  Union  cannot 
but take the lead.  
 
Secondly, there is limited bandwidth available 
for foreign policy. As the Heads of State and 
Government struggle to address the Eurozone 
crisis,  devoting  summit  after  summit  to  this 
natural priority, foreign policy inevitably loses 
out. The world does not stand still however, as 
the  crisis  in  Libya  has  shown.  Crisis  in  the 
Eurozone or not, if an external crisis occurs 
that threatens important European interests or 
invokes Europe’s responsibility, the Union will 
have to act. Unfortunately, even without the 
Eurozone crisis, the lack of any collective idea 
among  EU  Member  States  of  what  their 
responsibilities in crisis management are would 
have blocked the Union from intervening in 
the Libyan case. As it was, because of its great 
internal divide the EU abdicated not just in the 
field of crisis management (where an ad hoc 
coalition under the leadership of Britain and 
France took to action) but gave up the political 
leadership  as  well.  To  ensure  durable  peace 
and stability, the Union as such must now take 
the  lead  in  revitalizing  its  southern 
Neighbourhood  Policy.  And  this  is  only  the 
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regional  challenge.  Other  vital  issues  at  the 
global  level  need  our  attention  as  well,  from 
developments in Iran to partnership with the 
BRICs  and  reform  of  the  multilateral 
architecture.  
 
The fundamental decision to maintain the Euro 
and,  by  extension,  the  European  project  by 
deepening  financial  and  economic  integration 
has  been  taken.  The  long-term  trend  thus 
remains  ever  deeper  integration.  But,  thirdly, 
the  painful  and  drawn-out  decision-making 
process,  which  sees  many  divides  still  among 
Europe’s leaders, creates the image of a weak 
Union, paralyzed by dissent and unable to take 
resolute  action.  This  perception  inevitably 
undermines the credibility of any foreign policy 
initiative  which  the  Union  might  now 
undertake.  
 
A Foreign Policy Idea  
The  Eurozone  crisis  also  affects  EU  foreign 
policy at a less evident but actually much more 
fundamental level, because the way in which the 
crisis  is  being  discussed  and  thus  potentially 
addressed  basically  is  at  odds  with  the  idea 
underpinning the Union’s foreign policy – and 
actually the Union as such.  
 
The core idea of EU foreign policy has a simple 
logic  to  it  (Biscop  &  Coelmont  2011).  Only 
where  governments  guarantee  their  citizens 
security,  prosperity,  freedom,  and  equality 
(because  each  citizen  rightly  feels  entitled  to 
security, prosperity and freedom in a more or 
less equal way to his/her fellow citizens) can 
lasting peace and stability exist – as within the 
EU. Where governments do not provide their 
citizens with these core public goods, tensions 
will arise, instability and repression will follow, 
and citizens will eventually revolt and regimes 
implode,  violently  or  peacefully,  as  most 
recently demonstrated by the Arab Spring but 
also e.g. by the fall of the Soviet Union. The 
best  way  therefore  to  guarantee  peace  and 
stability  within  the  EU  is  to  stimulate 
governments  outside  the  EU  to  similarly 
provide for their citizens. The core phrase in 
the 2003 European Security Strategy expresses 
it thus:  
 
“The best protection for our security is a 
world  of  well-governed  democratic  states. 
Spreading  good  governance,  supporting 
social  and  political  reform,  dealing  with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing 
the rule of law and protecting human rights 
are  the  best  means  of  strengthening  the 
international order”. 
 
This  is  no  easy  task.  In  its  southern 
neighbourhood e.g. the EU until recently, and 
in  sharp  contrast  with  its  approach  in  the 
eastern  neighbourhood,  to  a  large  extent 
ignored the basic idea of its own Strategy and 
ended  up  supporting  any  regime  willing  to 
cooperate  on  terrorism  and  illegal  migration, 
regardless of its domestic record. It did so at 
its peril, for then the Arab Spring erupted in 
spite of this policy – had the Union remained 
faithful to its Strategy, it would (partially) have 
been thanks to its policy. The positive lesson 
to  be  learned  (or  re-learned)  from  the  Arab 
Spring is that the universal aspiration to equal 
access  to  security,  prosperity  and  freedom  is 
felt by people everywhere. In other words, it is 
the expression of as many universal values.  
 
But what of the EU itself?  
 
An Idea in Crisis  
“[The EU’s] achievements are the results of a 
distinctive European approach to foreign and 
security policy”, states the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation  of  the  European  Security 
Strategy. It is distinctive indeed, because EU 
foreign policy reflects the very same values on 
which  the  EU  itself  is  based.  The  internal   3 
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social contract binding citizens to the EU and 
the governments of the Member States requires 
the  latter  to  provide  them  with  security, 
prosperity,  freedom  and  equality.  As  a  result, 
since WWII a distinctive European model of 
society  has  emerged:  a  combination  of 
democracy,  the  market  economy,  and 
government  intervention  at  EU  and  Member 
State level to ensure the fair functioning of the 
market  and  to  provide  those  public  goods 
which  it  does  not  generate.  When  this  social 
contract is seen to be respected, it generates a 
sense  of  purpose  and  feeling  of  community. 
When it is perceived to be threatened however, 
it  is  one  of  the  main  reasons  for  citizens’ 
disenchantment  with  the  EU  (Verhofstadt 
2006),  as  the  Eurozone  crisis  forcibly 
demonstrates.  
 
The fundamental idea of EU foreign policy is 
precisely  that  its  model  should  not  remain 
distinctive,  but  that  governments  across  the 
world forge a similar social contract with their 
citizens, which need not replicate the European 
model  in  every  detail  (and  would  indeed  do 
wise to avoid some of its more cumbersome 
aspects) but which would reflect the very same 
universal  values.  This,  so  goes  the  strategic 
narrative  of  EU  foreign  policy,  is  the  only 
durable way of creating peace and stability.  
 
However, the way in which the Eurozone crisis 
is now being debated within the EU appears to 
ignore this strategy, this fundamental political 
idea.  Debates  and  negotiations  between 
Member States and the EU institutions are of 
course  highly  political,  but  only  insofar  as 
burden-sharing  between  Member  States  is 
concerned: who has to pay for whom? The real 
substance  of  the  debate,  i.e.  how t o  s a v e  t h e  
Euro, which measures to take, is presented as a 
technical,  even  technocratic  issue,  devoid  of 
political or ideological choices. The medicine is 
known,  it  is  just  a  matter  of  convincing  the 
unwilling  patient  to  swallow  it.  Certainly  the 
purpose cannot be doubted: the Euro must be 
saved.  
 
But is that really true? Of course the Euro must 
be saved – but not as an end in itself. The Euro 
also  is  a  political  project  and  a  symbol  of 
European integration, but first of all it is but a 
means  –  a  means  to  enhance  the  security, 
prosperity, freedom and equality of European 
citizens. If the Euro is saved in such a manner 
that  the  prosperity  and  equality  of  European 
citizens  are  destroyed,  the  end  result  will  be 
counterproductive for the European project as 
such.  For  the  internal  social  contract  will  be 
broken  and  citizens  will  no  longer  feel 
committed to the Union and the governments 
that did not respect it – in a Member State like 
Greece  this  might  already  be  the  case.  Great 
internal instability, possibly for years to come, 
will be the result.  
 
Thus saving the Euro the wrong way will be as 
bad for the Union as not saving it at all. It will 
be equally bad for the position of the EU as an 
international  actor.  The  strategic  narrative  of 
EU foreign policy cannot be maintained once 
the internal social contract, on the promotion 
of which it is based, is broken, for it will then 
no longer be credible, neither inside nor outside 
the EU. The EU will have lost its “soft power”. 
For sure, being a model for others to emulate is 
not  sufficient,  for  too  many,  swayed  by 
nationalism, radicalism, fundamentalism or just 
cynicism,  simply  no  longer  see  Europe  as  a 
model. Attractiveness alone does not generate 
“soft  power”  –  the  EU  must  be  seen  to  act 
upon its strategy. But for a proactive strategy to 
be possible, preserving and even deepening the 
model  within  the  Union  does  constitute  an 
indispensable prerequisite.  
 
If  the  EU  does  not  manage  to  maintain  its 
distinctive model of society, its foreign policy   4   
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will  soon  loose  its  distinctiveness  as  well,  and 
Europe  will  become  one  international  actor 
among others, and a weak one at that. Europe 
will simply no longer be Europe.  
 
Conclusion  
Of course Europe’s leaders must give priority to 
saving  the  Euro  as  the  best  means  of 
safeguarding the European social model that has 
been built up since the end of WWII, in parallel 
with European integration. But counterintuitive 
though  it  may  seem,  now  is  also  the  time  to 
promote strategic thinking in European foreign 
policy.  As  resources  become  scarce,  setting 
priorities  becomes  a  must,  to  ensure  that  the 
available means are spent in the most relevant 
and useful way. As the Eurozone crisis absorbs 
all  attention,  leaders  and  the  public  must b e  
reminded that meanwhile the challenges abroad 
do not go away and do not cease to evolve.  
 
Preserving  our  internal  social  contract  and 
continuing  to  promote  similar  social  contracts 
abroad should be the beacon guiding Europe’s 
leaders  throughout.  The  late  Tony  Judt  (2008: 
365)  was  addressing  Kissinger  and  US  foreign 
policy  when  he  wrote  down  these  lines, 
originally in 1998, but in an uncanny way they fit 
the  European  Union  of  2011  faced  with  the 
Eurozone crisis and the Arab Spring:  
 
“[…]  in  a  constitutionally  ordered  state  [or 
Union], where laws are derived from broad 
principles  of  right  and  wrong  and  where 
those  principles  are  enshrined  in  and 
protected by agreed procedures and practices, 
it can never be in the long-term interest of 
the  state  or  its  citizens  to  flout  those 
procedures at home or associate too closely 
overseas with the enemies of your founding 
ideals”.  
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